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Abstract
What are the effects of austerity on distributional policy? We exploit the
autonomy of Italian municipalities in setting non-linear income taxes and the
exogenous introduction of a fiscal rule to show that austerity increases income
tax progressivity. Consistent with this evidence, we find that in a panel of
countries austerity correlates with higher marginal tax rates on top- but not
on average-earners. The increase in progressivity in Italy is driven by high-
skilled mayors, while low-skilled mayors raise taxes uniformly. In the election
after the reform, high-skill mayors have higher reelection odds than low-skill
mayors, while there was no difference beforehand.
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1 Introduction
Large fiscal stimulus packages, such as those enacted during the global financial
crisis of 2007-09 or those in response to the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, lead many
governments to engage in some form of austerity in years following the crises. A
large academic and policy literature debates the efficiency aspects of fiscal adjust-
ment reforms (see, among others, Alesina et al., 2019). The social and distributional
effects of austerity have recently also come under scrutiny by economists, and per-
haps even more so by the general public. The popular belief is that austerity hurts
the poor disproportionately (Blyth, 2013; Mendoza, 2014; Varoufakis, 2016), and
that it has far reaching consequences on social outcomes such as on health (Stuckler
and Basu, 2013), violence (Cooper and Whyte, 2017), gender equality (Karamessini
and Rubery, 2013), aspects of local governance (Phillips-Fein, 2013), and election
outcomes (Dal Bo et al., 2018; Fetzer, 2019), among others.
In this paper we study the effects of austerity on distributional policy. We
start by investigating the relationship between cyclically adjusted primary balance
(as a measure of austerity) and statutory personal income tax rates (as a measure
of distributional policy) in a panel of countries. The estimated relationship, plotted
in Figure 1 and shown in Table A.1, shows that conditional on country and year
fixed effects, a 1% increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance to GDP ratio is
associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase (p < 0.05) in the marginal income tax
rate at the top (right panel), while we observe no correlation between austerity and
marginal income tax rates at mean levels of income (left panel). This preliminary
evidence suggests that austerity is associated with higher not lower tax progressivity.
Of course, it is hard to draw definitive conclusions from this exercise, since
these regressions do not have a causal interpretation. Therefore, our aim in this
paper is to provide the first quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of fiscal aus-
terity on distributional policy.1 To do so, we study a large exogenous reduction of
1Previous quantitative work has mostly appeared in response to the global financial crisis, and
it usually finds that periods of fiscal austerity are associated with an increase in income inequality
1
Figure 1: Fiscal austerity and tax rates at mean (left) and top (right) incomes
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Notes: This graph shows estimates from the following regression yit = γi+λt+βcapbit+δXit+it, where yit is either
the tax rate at mean incomes (left panel) or at top incomes (right panel), capbit is the cyclically adjusted primary
balance in percent of potential GDP, Xit includes log GDP per capita and log population as control variables, γi
are country fixed effects and λt are year fixed effects. The sample and data are described in Table A.1.
the fiscal space of Italian municipalities caused by the imposition of a fiscal rule by
the national government. More specifically, our quasi-experiment relies on a reform
in 2013 that extended the budget surplus requirement of the Domestic Stability Pact
(DSP) to previously exempted municipalities based on a population cutoff giving
rise to a difference-in-discontinuity design. Italy is well-suited to study our research
question due to the substantial autonomy that municipalities have over setting local
non-linear income taxes (Giommoni, 2019).
Our main finding is that local governments respond to the introduction of the
fiscal rule by increasing local income tax rates. The increase is monotonic along
the income distribution, but only becomes significant for tax rates on taxpayers
located above the median taxable income. The relative effects are quite sizable,
with the tax rates on the top decile of the municipal income distribution increasing
by 13% compared to the sample mean, and by about 3.5 times compared to the
(Ball et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2019; Heimberger, 2018; Woo et al., 2013). The micro simulations of
Avram et al. (2013) and Paulus et al. (2016) on several European countries present a more nuanced
picture on the distributive effects of austerity that depend on country contexts and measures of
austerity.
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lowest decile of the income distribution. We estimate that part of this effect is
driven by municipalities switching to a progressive tax schedule and increasing the
level of the exemption threshold. Since local income tax rates are small in absolute
magnitude in Italy, these reform-induced tax rate changes imply only small increases
in tax revenues. Whereas annual income tax revenues increase on average by about
5e per capita, revenues from the top bracket increase by over an order of magnitude
higher, amounting to about 73e per capita on average. The reform does not seem
to affect other taxes or non-tax revenues raised by municipalities. We also do not
find evidence for adjustments in total or redistributive spending, suggesting that a
reduction of public goods provision is unlikely to offset the progressive effects of the
local income tax.
We interpret our findings as the impact of austerity on distributional policy.
Considering the introduction of the DSP as a case of austerity is natural because
it necessarily required a fiscal adjustment in municipalities where the rule bound.
Consistent with this interpretation, previous evidence shows that the DSP induces
substantial fiscal consolidation (Chiades and Mengotto, 2015; Coviello et al., 2019;
Grembi et al., 2016). Contextual details of the Italian economic situation of the
time further reinforce our interpretation: the reform took place in the midst of
a severe recession caused by the sovereign crisis, with Italian real GDP shrinking
by 3% in 2012 and by 1.8% in 2013, while the central government cut transfer
to municipalities in several occasions between 2009 and 2015 (see Figure B.1 and
Marattin et al., 2019 for details). Both factors reduced municipal revenues making
thus more difficult to comply with the rule without a fiscal adjustment. Furthermore,
in these times the DSP, vertically imposed by the national administration upon
municipalities, became a symbol of austerity in the eyes of local administrators2
2For example, in his 2016 inaugural speech as national representative of the Italian mayors,
Antonio Decaro (mayor of Bari) saluted the abolition of the DSP with these words: “We have
recently closed a period of cuts, austerity measures, progressive reduction of resources [...] A
difficult period that was interrupted, fortunately, with the 2016 Budget Law which [...] translated
in effective and necessary measures: end of indiscriminate transfer cuts, abolition of the DSP [...]
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and became grossly unpopular among mayors across the political spectrum.3 This
situation is similar to the broader context in the European Union, where at the time
fiscal rules were being vertically imposed by the European Commission on many
national governments, and the Stability Growth Pact was very unpopular among
politicians and voters in countries with high public debt and sluggish growth.4
This paper is related to a large literature on the political economy of non-linear
income taxation (see Persson and Tabellini, 2002, for a review). Our baseline result
that, upon an exogenous shock, governments use the instruments of marginal income
tax rates and exemption thresholds to tax only those located above the median
earner are consistent with Bierbrauer and Boyer (2018) and Bierbrauer et al. (2018)
which characterize the conditions of politically feasible non-linear tax reforms. In
addition to this theoretical work, our evidence is in line with historical explanations
for the occurrence and rise of progressive taxation. This literature emphasizes the
role of compensatory arguments as the main mechanism behind the popular support
and ultimately the implementation of progressive taxes (Scheve and Stasavage, 2010,
2012, 2016). The idea is that high taxes on the rich allow politicians to compensate
the majority of relatively poor voters for some fundamental unfairness induced by
the state. Given that in our sample period Italy endured a double dip recession
and that the DSP was unpopular, this line of argument is also consistent with our
results.
Next, we study whether mayors, the crucial decision makers at the local level,
respond to austerity in a homogeneous manner. Our analysis is motivated by the
theoretical work of Bierbrauer and Boyer (2013), who introduce vote-share maxi-
mizing politicians with ex-ante quality differences in a Mirrleesian model of income
3For example, a rally against the DSP organized in November 2012 by the association of Italian
municipalities was joined by hundreds of mayors including those of Milano and Torino (centre-left),
Roma and Varese (centre-right), and Parma (populist). Mayors rallied behind a banner saying “Let
us set our municipalities free from the stupidity pact.”
4According to a recent survey, Italian members of parliament on average agree with the state-
ment that the “Stability and Growth Pact inappropriately constrains fiscal policy in member states,
and should be relaxed.” (Blesse et al., 2019). The same opinion is shared by a large majority of
respondents in public opinion surveys (SWG, 2017).
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taxation.5 They show that in equilibrium the high-skilled candidate is able to capi-
talize on her advantage and target the majority consisting of relatively poorer voters
by proposing a progressive tax schedule, whereas the low-skilled politician is left to
lobby for the votes of the rich. Consistent with this result, we find that the tax pro-
gressivity induced by the reform is driven by high-skilled mayors, which we proxy by
having a college degree or working in a high-skill occupation, while other observable
characteristics, such as age, gender, party affiliation, do not play a meaningful role.
On the contrary, low-skilled mayors rely on flat increases in the local income tax
to comply with the reform. This finding is confirmed when we address the issue of
selection of mayors by comparing the outcomes of high- and low-skilled politicians
elected in close races.
This finding contributes to the literature on how the quality of politicians
matters for policy outcomes. High-skilled politicians have been shown to increase
economic growth (Besley et al., 2011), to improve fiscal capacity by investing in
tax collection (Ferraz et al., 2018), and to provide a higher quality of public goods
(Martinez-Bravo, 2017), among other findings. We extend this literature by showing
that the competence of politicians also matters for distributional policy.
Finally, we test whether the introduction of the DSP had electoral conse-
quences for the incumbents. While we do not find such evidence for the average
mayor, we show that differences in adjustment strategies between high- and low-
skilled mayors made for large differences in electoral outcomes. In the first election
following the imposition of the fiscal rule, low-skilled incumbents were on average 30
to 37 percentage points less likely to be reelected conditional on running for office
again, whereas high-skilled mayors did not experience a significant decline in their
reelection prospects. Crucially, these differences in reelection odds only manifest
after the reform, and not before. These findings suggest that politicians implement
progressive tax reforms in order to stay in office, and that high-skilled mayors are
5See Bernhardt et al. (2020) for results on how the targeting strategy of two competing parties,
in terms of going for the minority of core supporters, the median voter or an outsized majority,
depends on the initial imbalance in quality.
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more able to use such a strategy than low-skilled mayors.
This finding relates to a rather polarized literature interested in understanding
the political costs of fiscal austerity. One strand of this literature finds that incum-
bent politicians do not face electoral costs when implementing fiscal consolidations
at the national level (Alesina et al., 2012; Arias and Stasavage, 2019; Brender and
Drazen, 2008).6 On the other hand, a number of papers show that fiscal austerity
has negative effects on voter support for the incumbent (Hu¨bscher et al., 2018; Talv-
ing, 2017) as well as on broader socio-political outcomes such as increasing support
for right-wing populism (Dal Bo et al., 2018; Fetzer, 2019), or increasing social un-
rest (Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017; Ponticelli and Voth, 2019). We contribute by
showing that austerity can indeed carry significant electoral costs, but that these
costs depend on the consolidation strategy. In particular, we show that electoral
costs can be mitigated by mainly increasing taxes on high-income earners.
2 Institutional Setup
2.1 Municipal Fiscal Rule
Since 1999, Italian municipalities have been subject to a fiscal rule, the Domestic
Stability Pact (Patto di stabilita’ dei comuni), introduced by the national govern-
ment.7 Originally, all municipalities were subject to the fiscal rule, but in 2001 those
below 5,000 inhabitants were excluded. In 2013, the threshold was lowered to 1,000,
6Possible explanations are that voters are fiscally conservative (Peltzman, 1992), that leaders
implement fiscal austerity in times and as part of policy packages that allow them to electorally
survive these reforms (Bansak et al., 2020), or that the divergent framing of the same issue provided
by partisan media mitigates voter responses (Barnes and Hicks, 2018).
7The main goal of fiscal rules is to achieve fiscal sustainability. Currently over ninety countries
have such rules (Eyraud et al., 2018). Asatryan et al. (2018) find constraining effects of balanced
budget rules on debt, but only for a class of rules that are enshrined in national constitutions, while
Eliason and Lutz (2018) show that a comprehensive state-level rule in Colorado does not affect
public finances, which is partly due to non-compliance with the rule. A meta-study by Heinemann
et al. (2018) finds that numerical fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy, but results become much less
assuring once one accounts for endogeneity. Fiscal rules have also been shown to curb corruption
(Daniele et al., 2019), to alleviate political budget cycles (Repetto, 2018), to worsen the selection
of politicians (Gamalerio, 2019), and to have wider macroeconomic implications (Combes et al.,
2018), among other findings.
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which is the reform that we exploit. Finally, in 2016, the Domestic Stability Pact
was abolished and a balanced budget rule for all municipalities was introduced.
In our period of analysis, the Domestic Stability Pact’s target object has always
been the Saldo Finanziario, which is defined as the difference between expenditures
and revenues, net of repayment of outstanding debt and of lending. Some budget
items were always or occasionally excluded from the Saldo Finanziario (e.g. spend-
ing for natural disaster relief, EU structural funds). The formula to calculate the
numerical target varied over the years, but it was usually defined as a function of
budget items in previous years (see Table B.1).
Monitoring of compliance by the central government was tightened in 2008
with the introduction of a compulsory reporting system, and of severe punishment
for non-compliers by the central government (Coviello et al., 2019). For instance,
punishments include bans on hiring, cuts of transfers from the central government
(proportional to the deviation from the rule), salary cuts to mayors and city coun-
cilors, a growth cap on current spending at zero percent as well as a ban on new
municipal debt. Qualitative evidence from the Ministry of the Interior suggests
that the central government implemented the reform quite thoroughly.8 Dovis and
Kirpalani (2020) show that the fiscal behavior of local governments will crucially
depend on central government’s reputation, and the strict regulations and enforce-
ment practices of the Italian context suggests that it is very unlikely that Italian
local governments tried not to comply with the DSP.
2.2 Municipal Governance
Municipal governments are composed of a city council, an executive committee, and
the mayor. In municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, each candidate for
the mayoral office has to be supported by a list of candidates for the city council.
Voters cast a single vote for a mayoral candidate, and can express one preference
8More than one hundred municipalities faced legal procedures according to ministerial decrees
available on the website of the Ministry of the Interior.
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vote for one council candidate within the same list. The mayoral candidate who gets
the most votes is elected as mayor. The seats in the city council are split as follows:
2/3 to the list of the mayor, and 1/3 split across the other lists in proportion to their
votes shares. The mayor appoints the members of the executive committee, and can
also remove them from office at any time. The mayoral term is five year long, and
the mayor cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms.9 These institutional
details make the mayor the most important player in municipal politics, while the
city council’s influence is more limited. The list supporting a mayoral candidate is
sometimes backed by national-level parties or coalitions, but is often independent
(so-called civic lists), especially in small municipalities. Also, since being a politician
in a small town is not a full-time job, most mayors work in their normal job while
being in office.
2.3 Municipal Fiscal Policy
The municipal budget is financed with transfers from higher levels of government
and international institutions, and by municipal resources such as local taxes and
fees connected to the use of public services. Local taxation plays an important
role in municipal revenues, averaging about 21% of total revenues in our sample
period (see Figure B.1). The three largest tax instruments in terms of revenues
are the property tax, the local income tax and the waste tax, accounting for 8.7%,
4.4% and 7.9% of total revenues in 2015 respectively. In this paper, we focus on
the local income tax surcharge, as it allows different degrees of progressivity and
its distributional impact is straightforward. The property tax and the waste tax
potentially also have distributional consequences, but those are more complicated
to detect and to analyze.10
In 1999, the local income tax was introduced as a municipal surcharge on
9This was extended to three terms in 2014 for municipalities below 3,000 inhabitants.
10For more details on the distributional consequences of these fiscal instruments see Messina
and Savegnago (2014) and Messina et al. (2018)
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the national income tax to grant municipalities more tax autonomy. In our sam-
ple period, the income brackets of the national income tax were split at 15,000e,
28,000e, 55,000e, and 75,000e, with their respective marginal tax rates being 21%,
27%, 38%, 41% and 43%.11 In general, the tax base is composed of wage income,
pension income, self-employed income, capital income, rents, and other sources of in-
come. However, income from several sources can be subject to alternative and more
favorable taxation (e.g. rents from real estate, investment in government bonds,
self-employed income below a certain threshold), so the bulk of the taxable income
consists of wage and pension income.12
The revenues from the municipal surcharge are based on the residency prin-
ciple and flow completely to the municipal budget. Starting in 1999, it allowed
municipalities to apply uniform tax rates of up to 0.5% of taxable income on top
of the national tax rates. In the period from 2007 to 2011, the cap was raised to
0.8% and municipalities were given the autonomy to set an exemption threshold:
tax payers with income below the threshold were fully exempted from the tax, while
those above would pay a tax calculated on their total income. Since 2012, munici-
palities can also set differentiated tax rates in every bracket of the national income
tax schedule. In other words, since 2007 municipalities can levy non-linear income
taxes. This setting allows us to study the progressivity of income taxation at the
local level.
The adoption of differentiated tax rates by municipalities has evolved quickly
over time and increased even further with the 2012 reform (Giommoni, 2019). Re-
stricting attention to small municipalities (below 2,500 inhabitants), no municipality
operated under a regime with an exemption threshold and a flat tax, 67% imple-
mented a flat tax without exemption, and 33% did not introduce any surcharge in
2007. In 2015, 8% operated a system with five tax rates, with or without exemption,
11The final tax bill is the gross tax bill net of deductions (detrazioni). The gross tax bill is
calculated applying the tax rates on taxable income. The taxable income is calculated as total
income net of exemptions (deduzioni).
12Approximately 80% both in terms of taxpayers and of taxable income in 2011.
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12% implemented a flat tax with exemption, 56% implemented a flat tax without
exemption, and 24% did not have any surcharge. Conditional on having a exemp-
tion threshold, the average threshold is about 10,000e with considerable variation
around the mean (see Figure B.2). Giommoni (2019) analyzes the 2012 introduction
of differentiated tax rates among Italian municipalities. He finds that the reform
allows mayors to strategically target different income groups generating an election
cycle: tax rates decrease before elections and increase afterwards. Giommoni (2019)
also shows, using evidence from google searches and survey data, that the munici-
pal income surcharge is a salient fiscal instrument for taxpayers. This is consistent
with the fact that the amount paid due to this tax is usually clearly visible on
the monthly payslips received by employees and retirees. Finally, Giommoni (2019)
also finds that the cyclical manipulation of the tax rates by mayors increases their
re-election odds.
Municipalities account for about 10% of total public expenditures (Grembi
et al., 2016). They are responsible for providing a variety of public services, such as
administrative services (30% of municipal expenditures in our sample period 2007-
2015), waste and water management (24%), public transport and maintenance of
municipal roads (15%), social services (8%), education services (7%), culture and
recreation (5%), economic development and tourism (3%), and local police and
judiciary (2%).
Spending on social and educational programs is of special importance to us,
given their potential redistributive nature and Italian municipalities’ relatively large
discretion over these items. Social spending includes, among others, assistance to
poor people, child care, or care for elderly. Education expenditures on the munic-
ipal level comprise of spending for pre-school and primary school services, such as
refectories and school buses. In our sample period, Italian municipalities are only
allowed to take up loans to finance new investment expenditures if the total amount
of interest paid was lower than a certain fraction of revenues from taxes, fees and
10
transfers.13 The main source of borrowing for small municipalities are loans from the
Italian Public Investment Bank (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) accounting for almost
80% of debt holdings.
3 Data
3.1 Sample
Our sample starts in 2007, the first year municipalities were allowed to levy non-
linear income taxes, and ends in 2015, since all municipalities were subject to a new
rule in 2016. We apply a number of restrictions on our sample. First, we drop
all observations that are part of a union for inter-municipal cooperation (Unione
dei Comuni) and at the same time have less than 1,000 inhabitants, since these
municipalities are subject to the fiscal rule irrespective of their population (931
municipalities). Second, we drop all municipalities located in one of the five au-
tonomous regions (Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and
Valle d’Aosta), since they are granted a special status by the Italian constitution
allowing them to set their own rules (1,392 municipalities). Third, we drop all mu-
nicipalities that merged in the sample period (79 municipalities). Altogether, our
final sample consists of 6,638 municipalities, which represent about 82% of all Italian
municipalities.
Figure B.3 shows a map of municipalities in our sample, distinguishing between
municipalities below 1,000 inhabitants (blue) and those between 1,000 and 2,500
(red). Table B.3 shows summary statistics of all variables for the whole sample as
well as for municipalities below and above 2,500 inhabitants.
13The fraction varied over time, from 15% in 2007 to 10% in 2014.
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3.2 Municipal Tax Rates
We collect annual information on the local income tax from the Italian Ministry of
Finance. This includes marginal tax rates for all income brackets and exemption
levels at the municipal level. We also obtain the (approximate) municipal-level
income tax base distribution from the Italian Fiscal Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate).
In particular, for every municipality we observe both the number of taxpayers and
the tax base in a number of income brackets.14 We make the simplifying assumption
that taxpayers are uniformly distributed within the brackets in order to construct
income deciles on the municipality level. This allows us to know the tax rates
that apply to each income decile of the respective municipality, e.g., the statutory
tax rate that a household earning as much as the 90th percentile of the municipal
income distribution has to pay. Using these tax rates as outcome variables allows
us to gauge which part of the distribution is affected by changes in tax policy.15 As
discussed above, one can distinguish between three different tax regimes: a uniform
tax, an exemption level and a uniform tax, or a fully differentiated tax schedule.
We plot the sample mean of the average tax rates for municipalities in the three tax
regimes before (Figure 2a) and after the fiscal rule reform (Figure 2b). As the blue
line indicates, the average uniform tax rate is about 0.48%. For both municipalities
with an exemption threshold and those with a fully differentiated tax schedule, the
mean tax rate monotonically increases along the municipal income distribution.
To test the distributional effect of the fiscal rule we employ several outcome
measures. First, we directly look at the tax rates at the nine income deciles of
the municipal income distribution. Second, we study the level of the exemption
threshold. Third, we use a binary indicator of whether a given municipality has
a progressive tax system or not. Fourth, to obtain a comprehensive measure of
progressivity, we use two indicators from the literature: the average and marginal
14See Figure B.4 for a histogram of the number of taxpayers in each bracket.
15We also use the average tax rate paid on annual incomes from 5,000 to 75,000eas alternative
outcomes.
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Figure 2: Municipal income tax: average tax rates
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
municipal income decile
uniform tax exemption + uniform tax fully differentiated tax
(a) before reform
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
annual taxable income
uniform tax exemption + uniform tax fully differentiated tax
(b) after reform
Notes: The figure presents the mean average tax rates in the deciles of the municipal income distribution for three
groups of municipalities: those with a uniform tax (blue line), those that have an exemption level and a uniform
tax rate that applies to income exceeding the exemption level (red line), and those with a fully differentiated tax
schedule (green line). The sample includes only municipalities with less than 2,500 residents. Panel (a) presents
data for the period 2007-2012; panel (b) for the period 2013-2015.
rate progression (Peter et al., 2010). We construct these variables by running the
following regression for each municipality-year pair (i, t) separately:
TaxRateyit = β0 + β1log(y) + ity ∀ y ∈ {1000, 2000, ..., 99000, 100000} (1)
where TaxRateyit is the average (marginal) tax rate at income y in municipality
i in year t, and β1 is an estimate of the average (marginal) rate progression. We
normalize the progressivity measures with their sample standard deviations to ease
interpretation. The resulting coefficient is by construction negative for regressive,
zero for flat, and positive for progressive tax schedules.
Furthermore, we calculate income tax revenues by income brackets. Specifi-
cally, we take the product of the total tax base and the average tax rate for each
individual bracket. To derive the average tax revenues per taxpayer, we then divide
by the number of tax payers in the specific bracket.
3.3 Municipal budget
We complement the data above with municipal budget data from the Italian Ministry
of the Interior (Certificati Consuntivi). These include detailed accounts of revenues
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and expenditures. Budgets report figures according to two accounting criteria: cash
and accrual bases. We use the latter, since policy changes are reflected in accrual
accounts more quickly. We convert all monetary values into 2015 euro and per capita
figures using the CPI series and annual population counts from the Italian National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Furthermore, we winsorize all budget variables at
the first and 99th percentile to account for outliers.
Expenditure figures are split between capital and current spending, and are
further disaggregated in broad categories (e.g. education, social). Revenues are
available by their source (e.g. local income tax surcharge, transfers from central gov-
ernment). We rely on the officially defined deficit (disavanzo) in the accounts, which
is the difference between revenues and expenditures plus the difference between rev-
enue carry-overs and expenditure carry-overs from preceding years. Carry-overs are
the difference between the figures calculated according to the cash and accrual bases
(e.g. credit vis-a-vis taxpayers, or debt vis-a-vis suppliers). Therefore, the official
deficit accounts for obligations originated in previous years, which still weight on
the public finances. According to this official measure of deficits, 54% of all munic-
ipalities in our sample are in surplus.
3.4 Politician and Election Data
We collect information on local elections from the historical electoral archive, and
information on politicians from the registry of local public office holders. Both
datasets are maintained by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The first database
includes the names of all the candidates and of the lists supporting them, and
reports information on election results. This allows us to construct both a rerun
and reelection dummy for incumbents. The former is equal to one if the incumbent
is not term-limited and runs again, and equals zero in case the incumbent is not
term-limited but does not run again. The latter variable equals one for incumbents
that run again and are reelected, and is zero for those who rerun and fail to be
14
reelected.
The second database has demographic information on all individuals who ever
held municipal public office, that is mayors, members of the executive committee,
and councilors. Usually runners-up are elected to the city council, so that we also
have information on them unless they give up their seat immediately after the elec-
tion. Therefore, we have information on birthplace, party, (potential) term limit,
gender, (former) occupation and education level for both the mayor and the runner-
up. Using these variables, we construct our two measures of politician’s quality, a
dummy for having a college degree and a dummy for being employed in a high-skill
profession before becoming a politician.16 We merge the two databases by match-
ing on name, surname, year and municipality code in order to obtain background
information on mayors and runners-up. The matching is successful in 70% of the
cases.17
3.5 Municipal Characteristics
We collect several further (time-invariant) variables on municipal characteristics
from the 2011 census: the share of female, college-educated, and inhabitants older
than 60 years as well as geographic variables such as altitude, geographic area and
a dummy for coastal location. The annual population numbers are retrieved from
ISTAT. We calculate the yearly share of income held by the top income earners
(more than 55,000e) from the tax base data by the Italian Fiscal Agency.
16For the latter, we rely on the ISTAT classification of occupations (ISTAT, 2013). We classify
occupations in category 1 (legislators, entrepreneurs and managers) and 2 (intellectual, scientific
and highly specialized occupations) as high-skill occupations. Among mayors from high-skill oc-
cupations, 76% hold a college degree, whereas among those from other occupations only 27% have
a college degree.
17Non-matches are likely due to second-placed candidates not joining the city council. Table
B.4 of the Appendix compares the covariates of matched and non-matched mayors.
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Difference-in-Discontinuity Design
Our empirical strategy relies on a natural experiment resulting from the extension
of the fiscal rule in the year 2013 to municipalities that were previously exempted.
In our sample period of 2007-2015, the Domestic Stability Pact applied to munici-
palities with 5,000 or more inhabitants until 2013, and to municipalities with 1,000
or more inhabitants from 2013 to 2015. One possible strategy could be a comparison
of municipalities around the 1,000 threshold using only data for the period 2013-
2015 in a classic regression discontinuity design. However, other policies change
discontinuously at the 1,000 cutoff (see Table B.2 for details) and thus the standard
continuity assumption is violated.
In order to isolate the effects of the fiscal rule, we employ a difference-in-
discontinuity design (Asatryan et al., 2017; Grembi et al., 2016). The intuition
behind this empirical strategy is that a confounding policy jump can be netted out
if the policy is time-constant. This assumption holds in our setup, as all of the
confounding policy discontinuities are constant over the whole sample period. This
implies that one can estimate the confounding effect at the 1,000 threshold in the
years before 2013 and subtract it from the compounded fiscal rule and confounding
effect estimated at the 1,000 threshold between 2013 and 2015. In other words,
this strategy amounts to a difference-in-differences design evaluated at the 1,000
threshold.18
More formally, let Yit be an outcome variable in municipality i at time t (e.g.
tax progressivity) and p˜it = pit − 1, 000 its normalized population in the previous
year. According to the law, the treatment status of a municipality is based on the
population of the preceding year.19 We therefore use p˜it−1 as our forcing variable,
18We do not evaluate the change of the 5,000 inhabitants threshold, since there is a simultaneous
policy change of gender quotas in local elections in 2013 (see Table B.2).
19Consistent with the institutional framework, we are using the yearly population numbers from
ISTAT.
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where at the cutoff the treatment status jumps sharply from 0 to 1. The difference-
in-discontinuity estimator can be written as follows:
τˆdiff−in−disc =
(
lim
p→0+
E[Yit|p˜it−1 = p, t ≥ 2013]− lim
p→0−
E[Yit|p˜it−1 = p, t ≥ 2013]
)
−(
lim
p→0+
E[Yit|p˜it−1 = p, t < 2013]− lim
p→0−
E[Yit|p˜it−1 = p, t < 2013]
)
where the first row describes the jump in the outcome variable at the threshold
between 2013 and 2015 (i.e. the compounded fiscal rule and confounding effect),
and the second row subtracts the jump in the outcome variable before the reform
(i.e. only the confounding effect).
We implement this estimator using a local linear regressions as in Grembi et al.
(2016) and estimate the following equation:20
Yit =β0 + β1p˜it−1 + Tit(β2 + β3p˜it−1) +Reformt[(β4+
β5p˜it−1) + Tit(β6 + β7p˜it−1)] + it ∀ (i, t) s.t. |p˜it−1| < h? (2)
where Tit takes the value of one if municipality i is subject to the fiscal rule in year
t, Reformt is a dummy equaling one from 2013 to 2015, and h
? is the optimal
bandwidth determined by the algorithm suggested by Grembi et al. (2016).21 Since
the results of local linear regressions may be sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth,
we also estimate results obtained with different bandwidths. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level to account for arbitrary serial correlation in the
error term. The local average treatment effect (LATE) of the fiscal rule is then
identified by the coefficient β6.
The difference-in-discontinuity estimator identifies the effect of interest if the
following identifying assumptions are met. First, as discussed above, other confound-
ing variables can change discontinuously at the threshold, but we must assume that
20We also estimate global polynomial regressions with varying polynomial degrees.
21We conduct a standard RD before and after the reform using the STATA command rdrobust
(see Calonico et al., 2014) and then take the average of the two optimal bandwidths.
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the change is time-constant. We test this assumption of local parallel trends by
means of placebo reforms. That is, we pretend that the reform was implemented
in some earlier year instead of 2013, and then re-do the baseline analysis on the
pre-reform sample. Second, in contrast to a classical regression discontinuity design,
where there cannot be any manipulation of the running variables, the difference-in-
discontinuity estimator allows for time-constant sorting unrelated to the reform. If
municipalities were to react to the reform by manipulating their population numbers
in order to avoid the fiscal rule, we would have selection bias in the treatment and
control assignment. We test this assumption with McCrary density tests both before
and after the reform, as well as with a density test of the change in density because
of the reform. One important caveat is that, even when our identifying assumptions
hold, we are estimating the local average treatment effect of the fiscal rule. That
means our results only apply to small municipalities and are not representative for
all Italian local governments.
4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
To examine the mechanisms driving our results, we also test for heterogeneous ef-
fects. We put special focus on the mayor’s quality measured by having a college
education or coming from a high-skill occupation. Following the literature on het-
erogeneous effects in an RD setup (see Becker et al., 2013), we interact every term
in equation 2 with a dummy for being a high-skilled mayor Dit:
Yit =β0 + β1p˜it−1 + Tit(β2 + β3p˜it−1) +Reformt[β4 + β5p˜it−1 + Tit(β6 + β7p˜it−1)]+
Dit[β
int
0 + β
int
1 p˜it−1 + Tit(β
int
2 + β
int
3 p˜it−1) +Reformt[β
int
4 + β
int
5 p˜it−1 + Tit(β
int
6 +
βint7 p˜it−1)]] + γi +Xit + it ∀ (i, t) s.t. |p˜it−1| < h? (3)
The heterogeneous treatment effect is then measured by βint6 . Xit includes
dummies indicating whether the mayor is female, has a college degree, is backed by
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a left-wing, right-wing or centrist party, is term-limited, her age and her win margin
in the last election, the number of years to the next election, as well as the top
income share and pre-reform deficits of the municipality.22
We also include municipality fixed effects γi to absorb any time-invariant het-
erogeneity. Nevertheless, we cannot fully exclude the possibility of unobserved time-
varying confounding variables determining both the mayor’s quality and our outcome
of interest. For example, if municipalities whose population has a higher preference
for redistribution tend to elect more skilled mayors, then we would erroneously at-
tribute the estimated increase in progressivity to mayoral quality rather than to the
population’s preferences.
For this reason, we turn to a more exogenous source of variation in the mayor’s
quality. We exploit close mixed elections, i.e. races in which the winning candidate
and runner-up have a different educational level.23 First, we restrict our sample
to municipalities whose mayors have been elected in a mixed election. Next, we
subtract the vote share of the non-college candidate from that of the college-educated
candidate to get the vote margin vmit, which acts as our running variable. For
positive vmit, the college-educated candidate wins the election, whereas if vmit is
negative, the non-college candidate wins. Our identifying variation then stems from
close elections, comparing municipalities, in which the college-educated candidate
barely won, to those in which she barely lost. More formally, let Dit be an indicator
that takes the value one if the mayor of municipality i in year t is college-educated.
We then estimate the following equation:
Yit =β0 + β1vmit +Dit(β2 + β3vmit) +Xit + it ∀ (i, t) s.t. |vmit| < h (4)
22In some specifications, we add additional interaction terms from Xit other than Dit to test
their relative importance in a “horse race”.
23This strategy has been extensively used in the literature on the effect of female mayors (see,
for example, Baskaran and Hessami, 2018). We focus on mixed races between mayors of different
education levels since the number races between mayors from low- and high-skill occupations is
considerably smaller.
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where Xit includes all control variables described above, as well as additional charac-
teristics of the second-placed candidate (gender, age and party), and h is the chosen
bandwidth. The effect of having a college-educated mayor is then identified by β2.
The most important identifying assumption is that the education level is the only
characteristic that changes at the threshold. We test this by using other observable
characteristics from Xit as outcome variables to see whether they also jump at the
threshold.
In a last step, we combine equations 3 and 4 to identify our heterogeneous
effects model using only the variation in the quality of the mayor induced by close
elections. That is, we interact every term in equation 3 with the vote margin between
college-educated and non-college-educated candidates and estimate it on the sample
of mixed elections. By comparing college-educated and non-college mayors that
barely won in a mixed election, we effectively control for unobserved confounders
that could possibly drive both the mayor’s educational level and tax policy.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
We start by presenting some graphical evidence of our results. Figure 3 shows
standard RD graphs estimated separately on the pre-reform (2007-12, on the left)
and post-reform (2013-15, on the right) samples for four outcome variables in sub-
figures: a) income tax rate at the first decile, b) income tax rate at the ninth decile,
c) average rate progression, and d) a dummy for a progressive tax. Each graph
plots local means of the outcome variable in ten normalized population bins on each
side of the threshold, and a linear fit of the data estimated separately on each of
them. Before the reform, the figure does not show a visible jump at the threshold
for any of the outcome variables. After the reform, we observe a positive jump in
the average tax rate at the first decile, and a more sizable one for the tax rate at the
20
Figure 3: Regression discontinuity plots: tax progressivity before and after the
reform
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(a) income tax rate at the 1st decile
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(b) income tax rate at the 9th decile
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each graph is a regression
discontinuity plot for pre-reform years (2007-12, on the left) and post-reform years (2013-15, on the right). The outcome variable is
reported underneath each graph. The running variable is lagged normalized population. Plots are obtained with the STATA command
rdplot (Calonico et al., 2015) organizing the data in 10 bins on each side of the threshold. The lines are linear fits estimated separately
on each side of the threshold.
ninth decile. This preliminary graphical evidence suggests that the reform induced a
disproportionate increase in the tax for higher incomes. The finding is confirmed by
the fact that both measures of progressivity display a positive jump at the threshold
in the post-reform years, but not in pre-reform years (panels c and d).
Next, we turn to the estimates obtained from the difference-in-discontinuity
estimation (equation 2). Figure 4 plots the local average treatment effect (LATE)
of the reform on the average tax rates at all deciles of the municipal income distri-
bution (estimates are shown in Table 1). We find that, first, all point estimates are
positive. This is consistent with the interpretation that municipalities raise local
income taxes to comply with the fiscal rule. Second, the size of the point estimates
is monotonically increasing along the municipal income distribution. Third, the es-
timated effect on the top tax rate translate to about 13% of the sample mean, and
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Figure 4: Effect of the reform on the income tax rate at different income deciles
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The figure plots the local
average treatment effects also reported in Table 1 and their 95% confidence bands. The LATEs are from difference-in-discontinuities
models estimated with a separate local linear regression for each tax rate and correspond to β6 in equation 2. The bandwidth is
selected following Grembi et al. (2016). The deciles refer to the income distribution in each municipality.
is about 3.5 times as large as the estimated tax rate effect on the lowest earners.
To test whether the estimated effects on high-earners are statistically larger
than the effects on low-earners, we re-estimate equation 2 for all nine tax rates
jointly, with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).24 We then implement several
one-sided Wald tests with a null hypothesis that the effect on higher incomes is not
larger than the effect on lower incomes. We present the p-values of all these tests
in Table 1. Overall, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% or 10% level for
almost all comparisons.
Alternatively, we also use the average tax rates at annual incomes from 5,000
to 75,000e as outcomes. The effects are again positive for all tax rates and mono-
tonically increasing in income, but only significant at the 95% level for incomes
above the national median income (see Figure C.2). As before, one-sided Wald tests
reject the hypothesis that there are no differences between the effects on high- and
24We use SUR because the tax rates along the income distribution are jointly determined by the
municipal government, and thus can not be considered as independent outcome variables. As such,
the confidence intervals plotted in Figure 4 are not useful for testing whether effects on different
tax rates are significantly different from each other.
22
Table 1: Effect of the reform on the income tax rate at different income deciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile
LATE 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.032∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
> 1st decile - 0.488 0.216 0.061 0.035 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.007
> 2nd decile - - 0.194 0.049 0.027 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.005
> 3rd decile - - - 0.063 0.034 0.018 0.008 0.005 0.004
> 4th decile - - - - 0.192 0.091 0.034 0.019 0.018
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.049 0.005 0.003 0.008
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.014 0.007 0.015
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.028 0.050
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.157
mean 0.331 0.335 0.347 0.358 0.364 0.366 0.367 0.368 0.370
bandwidth 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661
N 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel
reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local
linear regression for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 2.
The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). The deciles refer to the income distribution in each municipality.
The middle panel displays p-values for pairwise one-sided tests (estimated by seemingly unrelated regression) whether the
effect is higher than the effect on the tax rate at the first to eighth municipal income decile, respectively. In the bottom
panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical
significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
low-earners (see Table C.1).
As a final test for the effect of introducing the fiscal rule on tax progressivity, we
estimate the difference-in-discontinuity design (equation 2) using our four measures
of progressivity: the average rate progression, the marginal rate progression, the
exemption level (in e), and a dummy equal to one if the overall income tax schedule
is progressive. Table 2 shows that the reform induces an increase in the average
(marginal) rate progression of 0.14 (0.16) standard deviations, corresponding to 80%
(86%) of the sample mean. The reform also increases the probability of adopting
a progressive tax system by six percentage points (Table 2, column 2). This large
increase in progressivity is partly driven by the effect on the exemption level, which
increases by 600e, that is approximately by 67% of the sample mean (Table 2,
column 4).
Exploiting information on the municipal income distribution, we also estimate
the effects on tax revenues levied from taxpayers assigned to different brackets both
in aggregate and in per taxpayer terms (see Section 3). In line with the progressive
nature of the income tax rate adjustment, our findings suggest that individuals from
upper tax brackets contribute more to the extra revenues generated by the reform.
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Table 2: Effect of the reform on progressivity measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
average rate progression progressive tax marginal rate progression exemption level
LATE 0.140∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 600∗
(0.062) (0.027) (0.066) (316)
mean 0.175 0.087 0.181 892
bandwidth 668 650 668 635
N 17,775 17,319 17,775 16,955
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel
reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate
local linear regression for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6
in equation 2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). The average and marginal rate progressions
are estimates of the slope of the average and marginal income tax schedules. Progressive tax is a dummy for whether
the municipality has a tax rate which is not uniform. Exemption level is the amount of income (in e) exempted from
the income tax. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number
of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The average tax increase for a taxpayer in the top income bracket (above 120,000e)
amounts to 73e (47% relative to the sample mean) which is about an order of
magnitude larger than the effect on a taxpayer in the 15,000e to 26,000e bracket.
In general, the additional tax revenues per taxpayer induced by the reform are
strictly increasing in taxable income (see Table 3).
However, since only few taxpayers have large taxable incomes (on average
15 individuals have taxable incomes above 55,000e), more than half of the extra
revenue is levied from tax payers with taxable income between 15,000e and 55,000e.
Our findings also suggest that individuals with taxable income below 10,000e (on
average 38% of the total taxpayers) are the only ones to almost entirely escape the
tax rate increase. This result is consistent with our previous findings of an increase
in exemption levels.
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Table 3: Effect of the reform on income tax revenues by bracket
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0ke-10ke 10ke-15ke 15ke-28ke 28ke-55ke 55ke-75ke 75ke-120ke >120ke
LATE 0.78 4.92∗∗ 7.80∗∗ 15.88∗∗ 22.49∗ 52.88∗∗ 73.05∗∗
(1.02) (2.36) (3.69) (6.25) (13.53) (21.81) (30.60)
mean 18.14 47.11 76.11 129.62 177.36 195.38 154.85
mean # of taxpayer 308 136 241 109 8 5 2
bandwidth 664 654 665 660 618 479 726
N 17,684 17,444 17,709 17,587 16,544 13,163 19,180
total tax revenues
LATE 6.24 596.17∗ 1561.08∗ 1938.44∗∗ 406.45∗∗∗ 486.49∗∗∗ 627.70∗∗∗
(307.52) (317.41) (919.09) (760.57) (149.98) (182.34) (239.48)
mean 4,857.04 5,796.83 16,824.49 12,589.17 1,747.59 1,566.40 1,020.69
bandwidth 700 657 628 647 653 608 688
N 18,550 17,508 16,776 17,247 17,408 16,287 18,279
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports
the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression
for each outcome variable. The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al. (2016).
The outcome variables are per capita (upper panel) and total (bottom panel) tax revenues in 2015 Euros generated by tax payers
with taxable income included in the bracket reported on top of each column. The table reports also the sample mean of the outcome
variable, the average number of taxpayers in each bracket, the used bandwidth and the number of observations. Statistical significance
denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.2 Sensitivity Checks
In this section, we discuss the validity of the two major identifying assumptions as
described in Section 4. We also perform a number of additional robustness tests with
respect to the choice of bandwidth size and polynomial degrees, and a permutation
test using placebo thresholds.
First, the local parallel trends assumption states that any difference at the
threshold other than the fiscal rule has to be time-constant. To formally test whether
the local common trends assumption holds, we use a dynamic version of equation 2,
where we replace the Reformt dummy with year dummies. Normalizing our effects
to the pre-reform year of 2012, this allows us to track the local trends before the
reform and the dynamic effects after the reform. As Figure 5 shows, there is no sig-
nificant pre-treatment trend in the bottom tax rate (Panel a), top tax rate (Panel b),
the average rate progression (Panel c), or the probability of a progressive tax system
(Panel d).25 After the reform, there is an immediate significant increase in all vari-
ables, but the bottom tax rate. As a further robustness check, we conduct placebo
reforms in every pre-reform year of our sample. Specifically, we restrict our sample
to the pre-reform period and re-estimate equation 2 with the Reformt dummy tak-
25This also holds for our other outcomes variables (see Figure D.1).
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Figure 5: Dynamic effects of the reform
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(a) income tax rate at the 1st decile
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(b) income tax rate at the 9th decile
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each panel plots estimates
from the dynamic model on a different outcome variable, reported underneath each plot. The dynamic model is an extension of
the baseline difference-in-discontinuities model that includes year dummies instead of the reform dummy. The bandwidth is selected
following Grembi et al. (2016). Each dot is the estimate of the deviation of the outcome variable in the year reported on the horizontal
axis relative to the pre-reform year 2012. Dotted bars are 95% confidence bands.
ing the value 1 from year t onward with t ∈ {2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012}. If any
confounding effect was not time-constant, one would expect to pick up a significant
effect by at least one of these placebo reforms. Figure D.2 plots the results of the
five placebo estimations as well as that of the baseline results. The results show
zero effects for every placebo reform and every tax rate. As expected, the placebo
estimates exhibit a constant rather than a monotonically increasing relationship
between the estimated tax rate effect and the level of income. Next, we test the
continuity assumption by using pre-determined variables as outcomes. Table D.1
shows that none of the 16 variables are significantly influenced by the reform at
conventional levels.
Our second identifying assumption is that there is no manipulation of the
population numbers in reaction to the reform. In order to test this claim, we present
standard McCrary graphs (McCrary, 2008) displaying the density of municipalities
26
around the threshold before and after the reform, as well as a “dynamic” McCrary
graph, which shows the difference between the density around the threshold before
and after the reform (see Asatryan et al., 2017; Grembi et al., 2016).26 We do
not find evidence of a significant jump in the density of observations at the 1,000
population threshold either before (Figure D.3a) or after (Figure D.3b) the reform.
This evidence of no manipulation of population numbers in response to the reform
is confirmed by the results of the “dynamic” McCrary test presented in Figure D.4.
Our results are also robust to the selection of different bandwidths. Figure
D.5 plots the effect on low- and high-earners for bandwidths ranging from 400 to
1,000. As expected, the standard errors somewhat decrease with larger bandwidth,
but the point estimates remain stable. Furthermore, Figure D.6 and Table D.2
show that global polynomial regressions yield very similar results to local linear
regressions. Finally, the permutation tests of Figure D.7 re-estimate equation 2 at
placebo thresholds and show that our baseline effect on high incomes is larger than
any of the placebo estimates.
6 Mechanisms and Electoral Implications
We have thus far established that local governments increase tax progressivity in
response to exogenous consolidation requirements induced by the fiscal rule. This
section first explores heterogeneity in the treatment effects estimated in the previous
section. In particular, we study whether the type of tax adjustment is different
depending on mayor characteristics, with a special emphasis on her skill level. We
then study whether introducing the fiscal rule affects reelection chances of mayors.
26For the “dynamic” McCrary, we first divide normalized log population size in bins of width
0.01. Then we calculate the change in the total number of observations within each bin from the
pre- to the post-reform period. Finally, we fit local polynomial plots using a quadratic degree and
a triangular kernel.
27
6.1 The Role of High-Skilled Mayors
Following the literature on competence of politicians and its effects on policy out-
comes (see Section 1), we proxy skill with the politician’s education level, specifically
if she holds a college degree.27 As a robustness check, we also use a dummy for being
employed in a high-skill profession. About 45% of the mayors in our sample have a
college degree and 38% work in a high-skill occupation (see Table B.3).
We first test whether highly-educated mayors are driving our progressivity re-
sults as measured by both of our progression measures, the exemption level, and a
dummy for progressive rather than flat tax systems. Table 4 presents estimates of
equation 3, where the interaction variable Dit is a dummy equal to one if the mayor
holds a college degree. It turns out that college-educated mayors drive almost all of
the increase in progressivity estimated in our baseline model. Columns 1 shows that
mayors with a college education increase the average rate progression by 0.30 stan-
dard deviations in response to the fiscal rule, whereas non-college-educated mayors
do not change the progressivity of the income tax at all. This result holds when
including municipality fixed effects and several other interactions with potential
confounders, such as gender, a proxy for electoral competition, political orientation,
binding term limits, pre-reform fiscal position, and income structure (see columns
2 to 4 of Table 4). Furthermore, results look very similar when using the skill level
of the mayor’s occupation as an alternative measure (see columns 5 to 8 of Ta-
ble 4). Tables C.2, C.3 and C.4 show that this heterogeneous effect also holds for
the introduction of progressive tax systems, exemption levels and the marginal rate
progression. These results do not mean that low-skilled mayors did not raise local
income taxes in response to the reform, but rather that they increased tax rates
uniformly (see Figure C.3).
27In this measurement choice we follow the literature that most often approximates the skill of
politicians by their level of education (see, for example, Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Gagliar-
ducci and Nannicini, 2013). Other papers measure the skill of politicians by utilizing data on
politicians’ experience, pre-office market income, quality (rather than only level) of education or
the skill level of their occupation (Bertrand et al., 2019; Besley et al., 2017; Fisman et al., 2015).
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Table 4: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
LATE 0.012 0.013 -0.004 -0.016 0.010 0.015 -0.009 -0.010
(0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.167) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.162)
LATE x college degree 0.298∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.120) (0.119) (0.106) (0.108)
LATE x high-skill job 0.359∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(0.133) (0.133) (0.120) (0.119)
LATE x female mayor 0.069 0.076
(0.163) (0.168)
LATE x left-wing mayor 0.025 0.020
(0.154) (0.155)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.360 -0.344
(0.297) (0.300)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.489 -0.605
(0.342) (0.388)
LATE x low win margin 0.097 0.088
(0.114) (0.117)
LATE x term limit -0.041 -0.060
(0.100) (0.101)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.133 0.129
(0.132) (0.132)
LATE x low top income share -0.177 -0.174
(0.132) (0.132)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 0.176 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.173 0.177 0.177 0.177
bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668
N 17,378 17,092 17,092 17,092 17,292 16,741 16,741 16,741
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities
models extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms
included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the
interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college
degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was employed in a managing position or in an
intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The bandwidth
is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The heterogenous effects estimated so far in this section using equation 3 do not
have a causal interpretation because mayors’ education is not assigned at random to
different municipalities. As such, unobserved factors at the mayor or municipal-level
might induce omitted variable bias and thus drive the estimated heterogeneity. To
tackle this issue, we focus on mixed elections, in which the winner and runner-up
have different education levels. Using this sample, we estimate the heterogeneous
effect at the election threshold by interacting all variables with the vote margin
between the two candidates. In other words, we combine equations 3 and 4.
This empirical strategy accounts for any municipal level unobserved differ-
ences between municipalities with or without a college-educated mayor, such as
unobserved preference for redistribution. However, it does not account for mayoral
characteristics correlated with education. We thus start by testing whether any
characteristic besides the education level of the mayor changes discontinuously at
the election threshold. Table D.3 in the Appendix shows that out of 16 variables
only the mayor’s gender varies significantly between college-educated and non-college
mayors. Educated mayors are more likely to be female. Since there was no effect
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Table 5: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
average rate
progression
LATE -0.025 -0.035 -0.223 -0.391
(0.101) (0.100) (0.332) (0.302)
college degree -0.045 -0.048 -0.002 0.167 -0.019 0.145
(0.030) (0.032) (0.094) (0.264) (0.042) (0.100)
LATE x college degree 0.296∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 1.033∗∗ 0.954∗∗
(0.140) (0.146) (0.466) (0.400)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.179 0.179 0.168 0.168 0.081 0.081
population bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668
close election bandwidth 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
N 13,384 12,355 2,621 2,621 1,861 1,861
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations
for which we were able to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-
in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model
is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample is further restricted to municipality-year
observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs. non-college).
Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi et al. (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin
of victory, the treatment dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform
(β2) in equation 4. Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used
bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
of gender in Table 4 and we control for gender in all of our previous specifications,
we do not regard this imbalance as a serious threat to our empirical strategy. We
include all these mayoral characteristics as control variables in the regression models
that combine our baseline difference-in-discontinuity with close elections. Further-
more, Figure D.8 shows that there is no discontinuity in the density of the margin
of victory.
Estimates from these models are shown in Table 5 for the average rate pro-
gression. Columns 1 and 2 show that the heterogeneous effect estimated on the
sample of municipalities, in which the mayor was elected in a mixed election, is very
similar to the estimates obtained on the full sample in Table 4. Next, we present the
results of equation 3 interacted with the vote margin between the college-educated
and non-college-educated candidate in columns 3 and 4. The result confirms our
previous findings. The reform-induced increase in progressivity is driven entirely
by municipalities ruled by college-educated mayors. This result also holds when
using other measures of progressivity (see Tables C.5, C.6 and C.7) or varying the
bandwidth of the close election RD (see Table D.9).
The findings in this section have established that college-educated mayors re-
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act to the introduction of the fiscal rule by increasing income taxes progressively,
while other mayors increase taxes uniformly. We can rule out that college-educated
mayors favor more tax progressivity in general. Using a simple regression disconti-
nuity design based on close elections (equation 4) and restricting our attention to
years before the introduction of the fiscal rule, we do not find any evidence that
municipalities ruled by college-educated mayors have more progressive tax systems
(see columns 5 and 6 of Table 5).
6.2 Political Costs of Austerity
We now test whether the introduction of the fiscal rule was associated with a political
cost for the incumbent mayor. In particular, we estimate the baseline differences-in-
discontinuities model (equation 2) with the reelection and rerun dummies as outcome
variables (see Section 3 for a detailed description of these variables). Note that the
mayor’s skill level is a predetermined characteristic with respect to the reform in
2013, since we only consider the first election after the reform.
Based on a standard median-voter model, progressive taxation should be less
costly than uniform taxation, since only a minority of rich households are taxed at a
higher rate (Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2018). Additionally, in our context of austerity,
compensatory arguments behind progressive taxes (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016)
would suggest to shift the tax increase away from the poorest households if the
fiscal austerity imposed by the national government is perceived as unfair towards
the poor.
The near zero point estimate in column 1 of Table 6 suggests that there is no
evidence of political costs for the average incumbent. However, this average effect
hides interesting heterogeneity. When allowing for heterogeneity in mayoral educa-
tion in columns 2 and 3, we find that mayors without a college degree experienced
a severe drop of 30 to 37 percentage points in reelection probability, while educated
mayors do not undergo these costs at all. Both point estimates are significant at
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Table 6: Effects of the reform on mayors’ reelection odds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reelection reelection reelection reelection re-run re-run re-run re-run
LATE -0.004 -0.297∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.090 -0.085 -0.138
(0.059) (0.142) (0.132) (0.060) (0.111) (0.111)
college degree -0.073 -0.036 -0.025 0.209∗ 0.180 -0.019
(0.226) (0.218) (0.021) (0.119) (0.118) (0.022)
LATE x college degree 0.472∗∗ 0.471∗∗ 0.105 0.102
(0.235) (0.230) (0.190) (0.193)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.832 0.832 0.834 0.833 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.594
bandwidth 1059 1059 1059 1059 1088 1088 1088 1088
N 2,833 2,833 2,745 1,410 4,271 4,271 4,135 2,357
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Columns (1) and (5) report estimates of the local average treatment effect
(LATE) in the baseline difference-in-discontinuities model. Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) report estimates of the LATE for mayors without a college degree (LATE) and for mayors
with a college degree (LATE x college degree), estimated using the difference-in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Columns (4) and (8) report
estimates of the college effect from a regression of the outcome on a dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform.
Bandwidths are selected following Grembi et al. (2016). The reelection outcome variable in columns (1) to (4) equals one for incumbents that run again and are reelected, and is zero
for those who rerun and fail to be reelected. The rerun outcome variable in columns (5) to (8) equals one for incumbents that are not term-limited and choose to run again, and is zero
for those who do not and are not term-limited. Control variables are described in Section 4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the
number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
conventional levels.28 The probability of running for office again drops on average,
driven by mayors without a college degree, but these effects are not significant at
conventional levels (see columns 5 to 7 of Table 6). This is consistent with non-
college mayors also self-selecting out of office, but our results seem to be mainly
driven by voter selection. Again, results point in the same direction when using the
mayor’s occupation as an alternative measure of skill (see Table C.8).
Taken together, our findings suggest that more skilled politicians have avoided
the political cost of austerity by designing a fiscal adjustment based on progressive
taxation. Although we can not provide a direct causal link from increased progres-
sivity to higher reelection odds, we can rule out that skilled politicians have higher
re-election odds in general. Using a simple regression discontinuity design based on
close elections (equation 4) and restricting our attention to years before the intro-
duction of the fiscal rule, we do not find any evidence that college-educated mayors
are more likely to be reelected or to run again (see columns 4 and 8 of Table 6).
Any alternative explanation for our findings must thus explain why the introduction
of the DSP differentially increased the skilled mayors’ re-election odds during our
sample period. Existing evidence on the lifting of the DSP in 2001, when imple-
menting local tax progressivity was not yet feasible, actually shows that the fiscal
28The effect is very stable when varying the bandwidths (see Figure D.10).
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rule decreased the mayors’ education level in that occasion (Gamalerio, 2019).29
6.3 Alternative Channels of Adjustment
As discussed in Section 2, the local income tax is not the only policy instrument
that Italian municipalities can use to comply with the fiscal rule. To shed more light
on the full adjustment behavior of affected municipalities, we estimate the effects
of the fiscal rule on all revenue and spending categories using our baseline model
(equation 2) and municipal account data.
In line with our findings on the local income tax rates, revenues from the local
income tax increase significantly (see column 1 of Table 7). We do not find signifi-
cant increases in any of the other revenue categories: property tax, trash tax, other
taxes or fees, sales, loans, and other revenues (see columns 2 to 7 of Table 7).30 We
also do not find any significant effects of the reform on capital nor current expen-
ditures (see columns 8 to 10 of Table 7). Placebo tests for both expenditure and
revenue categories show that treatment and control municipalities were on parallel
trends before the reform (see Table D.4). To test whether the average expenditure
effect is masking heterogeneous effects across different categories of expenditures,
we estimate the impact of the fiscal rule on each one separately. Looking at various
expenditure items rather than just at social transfers only allows us to take into
account potential in-kind transfers which have been shown to matter for inequality
(Aaberge et al., 2018). Out of the twelve subcategories of municipal expenditures,
only tourism spending is reduced significantly with the other point estimates fluc-
tuating around zero (see Figure C.4). Importantly, the two categories perhaps most
associated with redistribution, social and education spending, are hardly affected,
29According to the author’s interpretation, skilled politicians avoid entering the political arena
when their discretion over fiscal policy is constrained. The difference with our results can thus
be explained by the additional policy instrument of differentiated local tax rates, which was not
available to mayors in 2001. Furthermore, our results seem to be driven mainly by voters’ demand
rather than purely by the supply of politicians.
30Consistent with these results, we also do not find any effect on property tax rates for either
main or other dwellings, or deduction amounts (see Table C.9). We only use the years 2012 to
2015 for these regressions since the introduction of the Imposta Municipale Propria.
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Table 7: Effect of the reform on municipal budget accounts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
income tax
revenues
property tax
revenues
trash tax
revenues
non-tax
revenues
transfer
revenues
loan revenues
LATE 5.10∗∗∗ -3.89 6.05 -6.22 -82.26 5.44
(1.89) (14.51) (6.70) (27.70) (78.20) (25.47)
mean 36.19 167.93 109.76 405.36 870.54 161.87
bandwidth 682 574 566 495 562 581
N 17,856 15,243 15,055 13,408 14,960 15,430
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
other
revenues
total
expenditures
capital
expenditures
current
expenditures
deficit
LATE -0.33 -98.21 -25.19 -52.02 -35.73∗∗∗
(20.20) (84.17) (29.68) (65.13) (8.17)
mean 114.93 1360.23 824.49 513.61 5.87
bandwidth 616 515 473 563 666
N 16,255 13,923 12,929 15,111 17,642
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the
local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for
each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 2. The bandwidth is selected
following Grembi et al. (2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column. All revenue, expenditure, and deficit variables
are expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros and are winsorized. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable,
the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
with the point estimate of social spending even being positive. Still, this null result
might hide heterogeneity between high- and low-skilled mayors that could also ex-
plain their differential political outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the
heterogeneous treatment effect of high-skilled mayors for all spending categories.
Table C.10 shows that there is no significant difference in any of the spending items.
We conclude that the redistributive effect of more progressive income taxes is un-
likely to be offset by adjustments on the expenditure side of local budgets.
Finally, we investigate the effects of the introduction of the fiscal rule on mu-
nicipal deficits. As one can see in column 11 of Table 7, we find that the official
deficit is reduced by 36e per capita (significant at the 1% level). Hence, it appears
that the fiscal rule was effective in terms of reducing municipal deficits.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence that governments try to
ease the potential distributional implications of austerity by favoring the relatively
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poor through more progressive income tax policies. Additional evidence suggests
that this strategy is used by more competent mayors and is subsequently rewarded
in the polls.
These results are consistent with the view that progressive taxation is prefer-
able to uniform taxation for the median voter. We believe that our evidence is
particularly relevant for austerity episodes induced by external factors (e.g., result-
ing from the imposition of budget constraints from a higher layer of government, or
being due to inter-regional spillovers in economic crisis), which can be seen as unfair
from the perspective of the local population. Our study suggests that governments
can tune their fiscal reform packages to mitigate the distributional consequences of
austerity, as recommended by IMF (2014), and that this adjustment strategy allows
them to improve their reelection odds.
Our findings are relevant for policy makers in countries subject to fiscal con-
straints, but whose public opinion is growing critical of austerity policies. Although
our evidence from small Italian towns cannot be immediately extended to other set-
tings, our cross-country evidence on the positive relation between austerity and top
income tax rates adds to the external validity of our results.
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Online Appendix (not for publication)
A Country-level Analysis
Table A.1: Cyclically adjusted primary balance and tax rates
(1) (2)
tax rate at mean incomes top tax rate
cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.071 0.615∗∗
(in % of potential GDP) (0.089) (0.291)
country FE yes yes
year FE yes yes
controls yes yes
mean 25.533 41.749
N 806 806
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Robust standard errors are clustered at the
country level. This table shows estimates from the regression yit = γi + λt + βcapbit +
δXit + it, where yit is either the tax rate at mean incomes (column 1) or at top incomes
(column 2), capbit is the cyclically adjusted primary balance in percent of potential GDP,
Xit includes log GDP per capita and log population as control variables, γi are country
fixed effects and λt are year fixed effects. Top tax rates are drawn from Rubolino and
Waldenstro¨m (2019), tax rates at mean incomes are from Peter et al. (2010), supplemented
by tax data from the OECD. The budget data comes from IMF DataMapper. Our sample
consists of 40 countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) over the
period 1990-2017.
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B Institutions and Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Fiscal rule details
year target target function of reference period pop. threshold
2007 Saldo Finanziario expenditures 2003-05 3,000
2008 Saldo Finanziario expenditures 2003-05 3,000
2009 Saldo Finanziario Saldo Finanziario 2007 5,000
2010 Saldo Finanziario Saldo Finanziario 2007 5,000
2011 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2006-08 5,000
2012 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2006-08 5,000
2013 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2007-09 1,000
2014 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2009-11 1,000
2015 Saldo Finanziario current expenditures 2010-12 1,000
Notes: The table reports details on the target of the fiscal rule for different years. Saldo Finanziario is defined
as the difference between expenditures and revenues, net of repayment of outstanding debt and of lending. The
target Saldo Finanziario must be below a target defined as a function of some budget account items measured in
a reference period.
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Table B.2: Population cutoffs in Italian municipalities before and after 2013
population mayor’s wage wage of ex.
committee
size of city
council
signature
requirement
gender quota fiscal rule
before after before after before after before after before after before after
below 1,000 1,291 1,291 15% 15% 12 12 0 0 no no no no
1,000 - 2,000 1,446 1,446 20% 20% 12 12 30 30 no no no yes
2,000 - 3,000 1,446 1,446 20% 20% 12 12 40 40 no no no yes
3,000 - 5,000 2,169 2,169 20% 20% 16 16 40 40 no no no yes
5,000 - 10,000 2,789 2,789 50% 50% 16 16 80 80 no yes yes yes
Source: Grembi et al. 2016, Vincent 2017, Baltrunaite et al. 2018. Notes: Policies varying at different legislative thresholds in the
period 2007 - 2015. The before columns indicate the situation from 2007 to 2012, while the after columns refer to period from 2013
to 2015. Discontinuities at thresholds over 5,000 inhabitants are omitted. Population is the number of resident inhabitants. The
wage of both the mayor and the executive committee refer to monthly gross wages and the latter is expressed as a percentage of
the former. Size of city council is the number of seats in the city council. The signature requirement refers to number of signatures
a candidate for mayor requires to be allowed to run, while the gender quota refers to candidate lists and new a system of double
preference voting conditional on gender.
Figure B.1: Municipal revenues over time
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Notes: This figure plots the share of total revenue for different revenue categories of Italian municipalities below 2,500 inhabitants.
Transfers also include revenues from the solidarity fund, financed by the property tax. Source: Municipal budget accounts (Conti
consuntivi, accrual basis, Ministry of the Interior.)
46
Figure B.2: Distribution of exemption levels
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Notes: This figure plots the density of exemption levels for the local personal income tax in Italian municipalities. The sample is
restricted to municipalities that have a positive exemption level and less than 2,500 inhabitants.
Figure B.3: Map of Italian municipalities
Notes: Municipalities in red or in blue are included in the sample.
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Figure B.4: Distribution of taxpayers
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage of tax payers in each taxable income bracket for municipalities with less than 2,500 inhabitants.
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Table B.3: Descriptive statistics
full sample population ≤ 2500 population > 2500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N difference
area (in km2) 34.384 47.298 58,323 23.364 23.063 28,335 44.795 60.209 29,988 -21.431∗∗∗
coast dummy 0.068 0.252 58,323 0.022 0.147 28,335 0.112 0.315 29,988 -0.090∗∗∗
altitude (in m) 334.405 275.099 58,323 448.871 292.956 28,335 226.249 204.985 29,988 222.622∗∗∗
mayor: age 51.912 10.138 57,278 52.018 10.550 28,068 51.811 9.725 29,210 0.207∗∗∗
mayor: female 0.118 0.322 57,278 0.117 0.322 28,068 0.118 0.322 29,210 -0.001∗∗∗
mayor: college degree 0.454 0.498 56,581 0.364 0.481 27,642 0.540 0.498 28,939 -0.176∗∗∗
mayor: high-skill occupation 0.378 0.485 55,517 0.306 0.461 27,335 0.448 0.497 28,182 -0.142∗∗∗
mayor: political 0.295 0.456 56,481 0.154 0.361 27,646 0.430 0.495 28,835 -0.275∗∗∗
mayor: last win margin 0.259 0.256 57,346 0.318 0.306 28,098 0.201 0.179 29,248 0.117∗∗∗
mayor: term limit 0.302 0.459 57,181 0.287 0.452 28,007 0.317 0.465 29,174 -0.030∗∗∗
years to next election 1.994 1.410 57,095 1.980 1.404 27,911 2.008 1.415 29,184 -0.028∗∗∗
share: age ≥ 60 0.292 0.064 58,323 0.321 0.068 28,335 0.265 0.045 29,988 0.056∗∗∗
share: female 0.508 0.015 58,323 0.505 0.019 28,335 0.511 0.010 29,988 -0.005∗∗∗
share: college degree 0.074 0.027 58,323 0.067 0.024 28,335 0.081 0.028 29,988 -0.014∗∗∗
top income share 0.106 0.078 58,323 0.075 0.075 28,335 0.135 0.068 29,988 -0.060∗∗∗
taxable income per capita 12,605.327 3,309.273 57,569 11,962.550 3,047.158 28,148 13,220.292 3,431.061 29,421 -1,257.742∗∗∗
tax rate at the 1st decile 0.348 0.279 58,062 0.329 0.264 28,148 0.366 0.292 29,914 -0.037∗∗∗
tax rate at the 2nd decile 0.355 0.278 58,062 0.333 0.264 28,148 0.377 0.290 29,914 -0.044∗∗∗
tax rate at the 3rd decile 0.388 0.272 58,062 0.346 0.262 28,148 0.426 0.276 29,914 -0.080∗∗∗
tax rate at the 4th decile 0.412 0.265 58,062 0.358 0.259 28,148 0.464 0.260 29,914 -0.105∗∗∗
tax rate at the 5th decile 0.425 0.259 58,062 0.365 0.257 28,148 0.482 0.248 29,914 -0.117∗∗∗
tax rate at the 6th decile 0.430 0.256 58,062 0.367 0.256 28,148 0.490 0.241 29,914 -0.123∗∗∗
tax rate at the 7th decile 0.433 0.255 58,062 0.369 0.255 28,148 0.494 0.239 29,914 -0.125∗∗∗
tax rate at the 8th decile 0.436 0.254 58,062 0.370 0.255 28,148 0.498 0.236 29,914 -0.128∗∗∗
tax rate at the 9th decile 0.440 0.253 58,062 0.372 0.255 28,148 0.504 0.234 29,914 -0.132∗∗∗
average rate progression 0.428 1.000 58,323 0.198 0.672 28,335 0.646 1.192 29,988 -0.448∗∗∗
marginal rate progression 0.433 1.000 58,323 0.204 0.690 28,335 0.649 1.183 29,988 -0.444∗∗∗
exemption level 2,019.226 4,718.198 58,035 997.086 3,348.429 28,135 2,981.029 5,545.364 29,900 -1983.943∗∗∗
progressive tax 0.179 0.383 58,062 0.094 0.292 28,148 0.259 0.438 29,914 -0.166∗∗∗
deficit 0.136 202.621 57,400 5.711 268.320 28,061 -5.197 106.800 29,339 10.908∗∗∗
income tax revenues 45.811 32.760 57,104 36.972 32.142 27,822 54.209 31.091 29,282 -17.237∗∗∗
property tax revenues 173.672 476.889 57,104 182.533 249.620 27,822 165.252 619.811 29,282 17.281∗∗∗
trash tax revenues 106.744 84.675 57,104 114.252 88.938 27,822 99.610 79.764 29,282 14.642∗∗∗
non-tax revenues 370.977 467.983 57,104 443.152 627.985 27,822 302.401 206.758 29,282 140.751∗∗∗
transfer revenues 682.851 1,296.016 57,104 993.877 1,752.916 27,822 387.333 420.556 29,282 606.544∗∗∗
loan revenues 143.526 383.864 57,104 173.298 489.218 27,822 115.238 241.489 29,282 58.060∗∗∗
other revenues 104.349 700.645 57,104 137.844 760.640 27,822 72.525 636.822 29,282 65.319∗∗∗
total expenditures 1,371.050 1,676.247 57,656 1,784.216 2,254.043 28,237 974.485 555.983 29,419 809.730∗∗∗
current expenditures 859.789 595.954 57,656 1,003.021 772.813 28,237 722.312 290.224 29,419 280.709∗∗∗
capital expenditures 511.262 1,360.819 57,656 781.195 1,858.662 28,237 252.174 420.030 29,419 529.022∗∗∗
exp: administrative 358.101 415.556 57,656 471.887 530.687 28,237 248.887 209.219 29,419 223.000∗∗∗
exp: culture 25.129 98.424 57,656 27.745 133.727 28,237 22.619 42.526 29,419 5.126∗∗∗
exp: development 15.072 123.668 57,656 19.856 167.832 28,237 10.481 53.803 29,419 9.374∗∗∗
exp: education 97.632 123.998 57,656 102.513 155.077 28,237 92.947 83.705 29,419 9.566∗∗∗
exp: environment 320.293 949.229 57,656 445.122 1,323.818 28,237 200.479 233.465 29,419 244.643∗∗∗
exp: judiciary 1.132 12.033 57,656 0.591 14.434 28,237 1.651 9.124 29,419 -1.060∗∗∗
exp: police 32.768 44.306 57,656 33.043 57.428 28,237 32.505 26.107 29,419 0.537∗∗∗
exp: social 97.483 152.768 57,656 93.587 183.620 28,237 101.223 115.537 29,419 -7.635∗∗∗
exp: sport 32.031 341.246 57,656 43.866 485.028 28,237 20.671 46.479 29,419 23.195∗∗∗
exp: resources 25.341 461.792 57,656 39.354 649.422 28,237 11.890 113.004 29,419 27.464∗∗∗
exp: transport 183.282 376.503 57,656 264.642 511.934 28,237 105.191 117.561 29,419 159.451∗∗∗
exp: tourism 26.458 278.320 57,656 43.964 390.665 28,237 9.655 68.931 29,419 34.309∗∗∗
re-run 0.594 0.491 13,149 0.599 0.490 6,563 0.400 0.492 6,586 0.010∗∗∗
reelection 0.798 0.401 8,271 0.827 0.378 4,266 0.768 0.422 4,005 0.059∗∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Column 10 displays the difference between columns 4 and 7. All expenditure, revenue, and deficit variables are
expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros.
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Table B.4: Descriptive statistics: matched sample
matched sample non-matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
mean sd N mean sd N difference
area (in km2) 34.855 47.672 44,781 33.000 45.448 12,357 1.855∗∗
coast dummy 0.067 0.250 44,781 0.071 0.257 12,357 -0.004
altitude (in m) 332.851 275.745 44,781 342.933 277.283 12,357 -10.082∗
mayor: female 0.115 0.319 44,768 0.127 0.333 12,249 -0.012∗
mayor: college degree 0.456 0.498 44,240 0.451 0.498 12,082 0.004
mayor: age 51.807 10.072 44,768 52.261 10.312 12,249 -0.454∗∗
mayor: political 0.296 0.457 44,129 0.293 0.455 12,093 0.003
mayor: term limit 0.295 0.456 44,725 0.330 0.470 12,196 -0.036∗∗∗
years to next election 2.007 1.433 44,779 1.949 1.319 12,316 0.058∗∗∗
share: college degree 0.074 0.027 44,781 0.074 0.028 12,357 0.000
share: female 0.508 0.015 44,781 0.507 0.016 12,357 0.001∗∗
share: age ≥ 60 0.292 0.064 44,781 0.296 0.064 12,357 -0.004∗∗∗
top income share 0.105 0.077 44,781 0.104 0.079 12,357 0.001
taxable income per capita 12,557.276 3,307.428 44,549 12,696.957 3,273.648 12,272 -139.681∗∗
average rate progression 0.427 0.999 44,781 0.398 0.966 12,357 0.029∗
marginal rate progression 0.431 0.998 44,781 0.403 0.966 12,357 0.028∗
exemption level 2,006.282 4,701.750 44,764 1,930.638 4,669.887 12,353 75.644
progressive tax 0.178 0.383 44,781 0.170 0.375 12,357 0.009
runner-up: female 0.147 0.354 44,781
runner-up: age 51.830 10.951 44,781
runner-up: college degree 0.443 0.497 43,232
runner-up: political 0.277 0.447 41,809
vote margin -0.033 0.291 44,240
mixed race 0.439 0.496 42,765
Notes: The matched sample includes observations for which we were able to match the main dataset with the election
data. The non-matched sample includes the remaining observations. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Column 7
displays the difference between columns 1 and 4.
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C Additional Findings
Figure C.1: Regression discontinuity plots: other outcomes
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(a) 2nd decile
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(b) 3rd decile
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(c) 4th decile
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(d) 5th decile
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(e) 6th decile
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(f) 7th decile
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(g) 8th decile
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
m
a
rg
in
al
 ra
te
 p
ro
gr
es
sio
n
−1000 −500 0 500 1000
lagged normalized population
before the reform
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
m
a
rg
in
al
 ra
te
 p
ro
gr
es
sio
n
−1000 −500 0 500 1000
lagged normalized population
after the reform
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each graph is a regression
discontinuity plot for pre-reform years (2007-12, on the left) and post-reform years (2013-15, on the right). The outcome variable is
reported underneath each graph. The running variable is lagged normalized population. Plots are obtained with the STATA command
rdplot (Calonico et al., 2015) organizing the data in 10 bins on each side of the threshold. The lines are linear fits estimated separately
on each side of the threshold.
Table C.1: Effect of the reform on the average income tax rate at different income levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
5ke 10ke 15ke 20ke 25ke 30ke 35ke 40ke 45ke 50ke 55ke 60ke 65ke 70ke 75ke
LATE 0.014 0.032 0.034∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
> 5ke - 0.034 0.049 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
> 10ke - - 0.358 0.195 0.152 0.152 0.116 0.106 0.100 0.096 0.093 0.091 0.089 0.088 0.087
> 15ke - - - 0.109 0.067 0.076 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.046
mean 0.331 0.351 0.363 0.367 0.368 0.368 0.369 0.370 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.372 0.372 0.372 0.373
bandwidth 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663
N 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660 17,660
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports the local average
treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable (reported
at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). The middle panel
displays p-values for pairwise one-sided tests (estimated by seemingly unrelated regression) whether the effect is higher than the effect on the tax rate at
yearly incomes of 5,000e, 10,000e, and 15,000e respectively. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the
number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.2: Effect of the reform on income tax rates at different income levels
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−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
a
ve
ra
ge
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 50000 55000 60000 65000 70000 75000
annual taxable income
Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment effects reported in Table C.1 and their 95% confidence bands.
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Table C.2: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
LATE -0.002 -0.002 -0.020 -0.008 -0.000 0.004 -0.009 0.012
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.070) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.069)
LATE x college degree 0.138∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.053) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046)
LATE x high-skill job 0.153∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.051) (0.050)
LATE x female mayor 0.045 0.045
(0.070) (0.072)
LATE x left-wing mayor 0.006 0.006
(0.064) (0.065)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.190 -0.187
(0.134) (0.136)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.292 -0.327
(0.232) (0.253)
LATE x low win margin 0.027 0.024
(0.047) (0.048)
LATE x term limit -0.007 -0.021
(0.041) (0.042)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.037 0.029
(0.054) (0.054)
LATE x low top income share -0.076 -0.077
(0.054) (0.055)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.086 0.088 0.088 0.088
bandwidth 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
N 16,932 16,663 16,663 16,663 16,848 16,321 16,321 16,321
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities
models extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms
included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the
interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college
degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was employed in a managing position or in an
intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The bandwidth
is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
LATE -45 2 -211 167 -77 10 -158 289
(406) (403) (385) (861) (357) (354) (355) (830)
LATE x college degree 1494∗∗ 1457∗∗ 1363∗∗ 1361∗∗
(604) (603) (553) (558)
LATE x high-skill job 1918∗∗∗ 1741∗∗ 1629∗∗ 1552∗∗
(700) (705) (656) (647)
LATE x female mayor 466 339
(819) (847)
LATE x left-wing mayor -94 -91
(743) (750)
LATE x right-wing mayor -1988 -1950
(1612) (1646)
LATE x centrist mayor -4601 -4856
(3388) (3518)
LATE x low win margin 124 138
(571) (583)
LATE x term limit -168 -260
(471) (476)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 470 366
(657) (656)
LATE x low top income share -1115∗ -1068
(668) (670)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 896 906 906 906 886 904 904 904
bandwidth 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635
N 16,577 16,319 16,319 16,319 16,493 15,985 15,985 15,985
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities
models extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms
included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the
interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college
degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was employed in a managing position or in an
intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The bandwidth
is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
LATE 0.005 0.006 -0.009 0.055 0.016 0.024 -0.002 0.080
(0.086) (0.086) (0.084) (0.180) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.176)
LATE x college degree 0.353∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(0.127) (0.126) (0.115) (0.117)
LATE x high-skill job 0.393∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗
(0.139) (0.139) (0.127) (0.125)
LATE x female mayor 0.039 0.039
(0.168) (0.172)
LATE x left-wing mayor -0.009 -0.008
(0.160) (0.161)
LATE x right-wing mayor -0.459 -0.444
(0.330) (0.334)
LATE x centrist mayor -0.523 -0.630∗
(0.331) (0.375)
LATE x low win margin 0.082 0.076
(0.121) (0.125)
LATE x term limit -0.079 -0.105
(0.105) (0.107)
LATE x high pre-reform deficit 0.126 0.115
(0.140) (0.140)
LATE x low top income share -0.244∗ -0.245∗
(0.143) (0.144)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
mean 0.182 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.179 0.183 0.183 0.183
bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668 668 668
N 17,378 17,092 17,092 17,092 17,292 16,741 16,741 16,741
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities
models extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms
included in the baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the
interaction rows report the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3. We measure mayors’ skills using two dummies: college
degree, which is equal to one in case the mayor holds one; and high-skill job, which is equal to one in case the mayor was employed in a managing position or in an
intellectual profession (e.g. lawyer, medical doctor). Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. The estimation method is local linear regression. The bandwidth
is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown.
Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.3: Effect of the reform on income tax rates by mayor’s skill level
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates
of difference-in-discontinuities models extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The blue estimates refer to the local
average treatment effect for mayors without a college degree (β6), while the red estimates plot the sum of β6 and β
int
6 referring to
the effect for mayors with a college degree in equation 3.
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Table C.5: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
progressive
tax
LATE -0.019 -0.024 -0.066 -0.143
(0.042) (0.043) (0.183) (0.189)
college degree -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 0.235 0.024 0.074
(0.018) (0.019) (0.048) (0.210) (0.022) (0.064)
LATE x college degree 0.140∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.510∗∗ 0.339
(0.062) (0.064) (0.257) (0.224)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.041 0.041
population bandwidth 650 650 650 650 650 650
close election bandwidth 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
N 13,043 12,028 1,949 1,949 1,377 1,377
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations
for which we were able to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-
in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model
is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample is further restricted to municipality-year
observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs. non-college).
Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi et al. (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin
of victory, the treatment dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform
(β2) in equation 4. Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used
bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
exemption
level
LATE -72 -87 -1550 -932
(498) (502) (2280) (2368)
college degree -118 -116 -182 941 116 386
(163) (177) (539) (2092) (209) (526)
LATE x college degree 1440∗ 1458∗ 5694∗ 3007
(735) (754) (3130) (2848)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 910.04 909.19 862.72 862.72 371.17 371.17
population bandwidth 635 635 635 635 635 635
close election bandwidth 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
N 12,764 11,770 2,119 2,119 1,509 1,509
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations
for which we were able to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-
in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model
is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample is further restricted to municipality-year
observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs. non-college).
Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi et al. (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin
of victory, the treatment dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform
(β2) in equation 4. Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used
bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill: mixed election RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
marginal rate
progression
LATE -0.022 -0.034 -0.157 -0.317
(0.105) (0.105) (0.387) (0.392)
college degree -0.045 -0.049 0.017 0.303 0.022 0.072
(0.029) (0.031) (0.103) (0.390) (0.041) (0.078)
LATE x college degree 0.320∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 1.077∗∗ 0.828∗
(0.146) (0.153) (0.524) (0.478)
controls yes yes yes yes yes
mixed election RD yes yes yes yes
municipality FE yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.184 0.184 0.175 0.175 0.081 0.081
population bandwidth 668 668 668 668 668 668
close election bandwidth 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
N 13,384 12,355 2,418 2,418 1,725 1,725
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The sample is restricted to observations
for which we were able to match the main dataset with the election data. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) report estimates of the difference-
in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. In rows with “mixed election RD” switched on, the model
is augmented with the margin of victory and its interaction with all other terms, and the sample is further restricted to municipality-year
observations, in which the incumbent mayor was elected in a race against a runner up with a different education level (college vs. non-college).
Population bandwidths are selected following Grembi et al. (2016). Election bandwidths are selected using the using the STATA command
rdrobust. Columns (5) and (6) report estimates of the college effect from regression discontinuity models where the running variable is the margin
of victory, the treatment dummy is equal to one if the mayors holds a college degree, and the sample is restricted to years before the reform
(β2) in equation 4. Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used
bandwidths and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Effects of the reform on mayors’ reelection odds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
reelection reelection reelection reelection re-run re-run re-run re-run
LATE -0.037 -0.323∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.069 -0.041
(0.060) (0.144) (0.129) (0.061) (0.112) (0.116)
high-skill job 0.400 0.235 -0.019 0.190 0.099 0.010
(0.295) (0.278) (0.025) (0.134) (0.137) (0.027)
LATE x high-skill job 0.644∗∗ 0.570∗∗ 0.001 -0.183
(0.269) (0.251) (0.227) (0.235)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes
pre-reform sample yes yes
mean 0.837 0.837 0.839 0.839 0.624 0.624 0.629 0.618
bandwidth 1059 1059 1059 1059 1088 1088 1088 1088
N 2,675 2,675 2,548 1,276 3,935 3,935 3,720 2,059
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Columns (1) and (5) report estimates of the local average treatment effect
(LATE) in the baseline difference-in-discontinuities model. Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) report estimates of the LATE for mayors without a high-skill job (LATE) and for mayors
with a high-skill job (LATE x high-skill job), estimated using the difference-in-discontinuities model extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Columns (4) and (8) report
estimates of the high-skill job effect from a regression of the outcome on a dummy is equal to one if the mayors has a high-skill job, and the sample is restricted to years before the
reform. Bandwidths are selected following Grembi et al. (2016). The reelection outcome variable in columns (1) to (4) equals one for incumbents that run again and are reelected, and
is zero for those who rerun and fail to be reelected. The rerun outcome variable in columns (5) to (8) equals one for incumbents that are not term-limited and choose to run again, and
is zero for those who do not and are not term-limited.Control variables are described in Section 4. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth
and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.9: Effect of the reform on property tax rates
(1) (2) (3)
property tax on main dwellings property tax on other dwellings deduction amount
LATE 0.070 0.065 0.969
(0.053) (0.074) (1.026)
mean 4.203 8.538 198.891
bandwidth 724 651 738
N 7.949 7.227 8.097
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013.
The top panel reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model
estimated with a separate local linear regression for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each
column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 2. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al.
(2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column. The sample includes the years 2012 to
2015. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number
of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
60
Figure C.4: Effect of the reform on municipal expenditures by categories
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The figure plots the LATE
corresponding to β6 in equation 2 and its 95% confidence bands. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). Outcome
variables are reported on top of each column. All variables are expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros and are winsorized.
Table C.10: Differential effect of the reform by mayor’s skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exp: administrative exp: culture exp: development exp: education exp: environment exp: judiciary
LATE -19.07 1.50 -1.95 -6.96 -54.82 -0.03
(17.02) (5.11) (3.30) (10.22) (60.10) (0.08)
LATE x college degree 47.95 -3.91 -5.48 -3.57 93.65 0.15
(34.15) (9.03) (6.96) (16.26) (105.79) (0.12)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
mean 418.10 21.28 11.73 104.06 379.13 0.19
bandwidth 514 664 694 583 509 530
N 13,397 16,918 17,618 15,036 13,306 13,738
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
exp: police exp: social exp: sport exp: resources exp: transport exp: tourism
LATE 0.59 4.31 -6.73 -9.68 -28.19 -12.81∗
(1.77) (10.44) (5.41) (9.63) (20.84) (6.85)
LATE x college degree 1.03 1.62 9.58 28.80∗ 44.90 4.98
(3.27) (16.52) (8.62) (16.12) (37.95) (12.92)
municipality FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
mean 32.38 84.83 29.58 23.14 225.53 25.72
bandwidth 640 549 777 564 591 688
N 16,359 14,225 19,469 14,577 15,216 17,486
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The table reports estimates of difference-in-discontinuities models
extended to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. The extended models include one or more binary covariates and their interactions with all the terms included in the
baseline model. The row LATE reports the local average treatment effect in case the additional interaction variables are equal to zero (β6), while the interaction rows report
the differential effects when the interaction variables are switched on (βint6 ) in equation 3. Details on all covariates are described in Section 4. The estimation method is
local linear regression. The bandwidth is selected following Grembi et al. (2016). In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and
the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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D Robustness Tests
Figure D.1: Dynamic model: other outcomes
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Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. Each panel plots estimates
from the dynamic model on a different outcome variable, reported underneath each plot. The dynamic model is an extension of
the baseline difference-in-discontinuities model that includes year dummies instead of the reform dummy. The bandwidth is selected
following Grembi et al. (2016). Each dot is the estimate of the deviation of the outcome variable in the year reported on the horizontal
axis relative to the pre-reform year 2012. Dotted bars are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure D.2: Income tax rates by municipal income deciles: placebo reforms
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Notes: The blue line plots the local average treatment effect (β6) and its 95% confidence bands from Table 1. All other lines plot
placebo estimates. These are obtained by restricting the sample to pre-reform years, assigning the reform to a different year from
2008 to 2012 and finally re-estimating equation 2.
Table D.1: Continuity tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mayor:
female
mayor: age mayor:
college
degree
mayor:
high-skill
occupation
mayor:
right-wing
mayor:
left-wing
mayor:
center
mayor: term
limit
LATE -0.012 0.492 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.021
(0.026) (0.876) (0.037) (0.043) (0.011) (0.028) (0.007) (0.029)
mean 0.118 52.029 0.361 0.312 0.023 0.108 0.011 0.287
bandwidth 658 625 662 530 597 619 668 563
N 17,404 16,565 17,238 13,946 15,917 16,464 17,670 15,046
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
share: age ≥
60
share: female log area coast dummy altitude (in
m)
years to next
election
top income
share
log taxable
income per
capita
LATE 0.005 -0.002∗ 0.039 0.012∗ -23.308 -0.066 0.006 0.020
(0.005) (0.001) (0.052) (0.007) (21.546) (0.077) (0.005) (0.014)
mean 0.321 0.506 2.766 0.021 445.792 1.971 0.075 9.998
bandwidth 586 621 587 581 526 511 614 658
N 15,771 16,604 15,796 15,650 14,244 13,835 16,437 17,537
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The top panel reports
the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated with a separate local linear regression
for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column). The LATE corresponds to β6 in equation 2. The bandwidth is
selected following Grembi et al. (2016). Outcome variables are reported on top of each column. In the bottom panel, the sample
mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as:
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure D.4: Dynamic McCrary test
Notes: The figure presents the density plot for the difference-in-discontinuities design in the spirit of (McCrary, 2008). Each dot is
the local average of the change in the total number of observations between the the pre- and post-reform periods within each bin of
normalized log population. Each bin has width equal to 0.01. The lines are fit of local polynomial using a quadratic degree and a
triangular kernel. Grey bans are the corresponding 95% confidence bands.
Figure D.3: McCrary test before and after the reform
(a) pre-reform (b) post-reform
Notes: This figure presents McCrary density plots (McCrary, 2008). The left panel shows a pooled graph for all pre-reform years,
while the right panel shows pool graph for all post-reform years.
64
Figure D.5: Estimates by bandwidth
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Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment effect (β6) and its 95% confidence bands reported in Table 1 for different
bandwidths. The dashed vertical line refers to the optimal bandwidth.
Figure D.6: Income tax rates: global polynomial regressions
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Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment effects reported in Table D.2 and their 95% confidence bands.
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Table D.2: Income tax rates: global polynomial regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
tax rate at 1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile 6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile
polynomial of order 1
LATE 0.005 0.011 0.024∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
mean 0.329 0.332 0.346 0.358 0.364 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.371
N 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128
> 1st decile - 0.055 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
> 2nd decile - - 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
> 3rd decile - - - 0.029 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.003
> 4th decile - - - - 0.125 0.097 0.056 0.036 0.026
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.252 0.100 0.056 0.040
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.066 0.042 0.030
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.102 0.051
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.075
polynomial of order 2
LATE -0.005 -0.000 0.012 0.022 0.026∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
mean 0.329 0.332 0.346 0.358 0.364 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.371
N 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128
> 1st decile - 0.101 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
> 2nd decile - - 0.035 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
> 3rd decile - - - 0.03 0.022 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.005
> 4th decile - - - - 0.214 0.103 0.060 0.038 0.042
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.055 0.016 0.011 0.026
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.082 0.034 0.063
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.053 0.107
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.285
polynomial of order 3
LATE 0.010 0.013 0.025 0.032∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
mean 0.329 0.332 0.346 0.358 0.364 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.371
N 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128 28,128
> 1st decile - 0.161 0.055 0.023 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.004
> 2nd decile - - 0.095 0.040 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.005 0.006
> 3rd decile - - - 0.139 0.082 0.050 0.025 0.016 0.021
> 4th decile - - - - 0.215 0.120 0.053 0.030 0.042
> 5th decile - - - - - 0.140 0.030 0.014 0.036
> 6th decile - - - - - - 0.024 0.011 0.050
> 7th decile - - - - - - - 0.039 0.147
> 8th decile - - - - - - - - 0.462
Notes: The reform is the introduction of the fiscal rule for municipalities above 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. The
top panel reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the difference-in-discontinuities model estimated
with a separate global regression for each outcome variable (reported at the top of each column) on the sample
of all municipalities below 2,500 inhabitants with different polynomial orders n. The deciles refer to the income
distribution in each municipality. The middle panel displays p-values for pairwise one-sided tests (estimated by
seemingly unrelated regression) whether the effect is higher than the effect on the tax rate at the first to eighth
municipal income decile, respectively. In the bottom panel, the sample mean of the outcome variable, the used
bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. Statistical significance denoted as: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure D.7: Placebo thresholds
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(a) tax rate at the 1st decile
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(b) tax rate at the 9th decile
Notes: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of placebo estimates for the income tax rate at the first (panel a) and nineth
decile (panel b). The placebo estimates are obtained by estimating equation 2 at false thresholds between 400 and 900 as well as
1,100 and 1,600. The effect at the true threshold is indicated by the vertical line.
Table D.3: Mixed election disconuinity: covariate balancing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mayor:
female
mayor: age mayor:
political
mayor: term
limit
runner-up:
female
runner-up:
age
runner-up:
political
years to
election
RD estimate 0.187∗∗∗ -2.602 -0.001 -0.071 -0.024 3.120 0.036 0.020
(0.066) (1.872) (0.058) (0.060) (0.075) (2.669) (0.070) (0.053)
mean 0.131 51.227 0.130 0.155 0.128 52.016 0.182 1.977
bandwidth 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.15
N 2,223 2,001 2,010 2,001 1,668 1,740 2,063 2,229
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
share: college share: female share: age ≥
60
log area coast dummy altitude (in
m)
top income
share
log taxable
income per
capita
RD estimate 0.003 -0.002 -0.007 0.043 0.011 -15.828 0.013 -0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.158) (0.037) (49.379) (0.014) (0.047)
mean 0.069 0.507 0.321 2.886 0.018 478.622 0.069 9.306
bandwidth 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.14
N 1,892 1,750 2,001 1,834 1,852 2,375 2,027 2,108
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; This table displays regression discontinuity estimates using the STATA command rdrobust
in a mixed election regression discontinuity design for the whole sample period (Calonico et al., 2017).
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Figure D.8: McCrary test for mixed elections between college- and non-college-
educated candidates
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Notes: This figure presents the McCrary density plot for close elections between college- and non-college-educated candidates.
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Figure D.9: Close election RD: estimates by bandwidth
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(b) progressive tax system
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Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment interaction effect for the mayor having a college degree (LATE x college degree)
and its 95% confidence bands reported in Tables 5 (Panel a), C.5 (Panel b), C.7 (Panel c) and C.6 (Panel d) for different bandwidths.
The dashed vertical line refers to the optimal bandwidth.
Figure D.10: Estimates by bandwidth: political outcomes
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Notes: This figure plots the local average treatment interaction effect for the mayor having a college degree (LATE x college degree)
and its 95% confidence bands reported in Table 6 for different bandwidths. The dashed vertical line refers to the optimal bandwidth.
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Table D.4: Municipal budget accounts: placebo regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
income tax
revenues
property tax
revenues
trash tax
revenues
non-tax
revenues
transfer
revenues
loan revenues
placebo in 2008 0.49 5.42 -3.01 -20.09 -4.23 7.35
(1.57) (9.45) (3.93) (19.04) (80.50) (26.08)
placebo in 2009 1.20 -1.54 -6.04 -24.38 37.52 6.43
(1.36) (8.26) (3.79) (20.60) (66.85) (25.17)
placebo in 2010 -0.34 -0.56 -7.93∗ -28.42 45.86 9.97
(1.25) (7.77) (4.05) (20.92) (67.41) (23.42)
placebo in 2011 0.53 3.37 -8.56∗∗ -19.42 -39.05 -10.07
(1.28) (8.09) (4.31) (21.88) (66.91) (23.06)
placebo in 2012 2.51 12.62 -3.93 -14.18 -32.32 -17.42
(1.57) (9.54) (4.09) (24.05) (76.90) (26.41)
mean 32.64 182.74 112.06 383.67 887.94 159.74
bandwidth 682 574 566 495 562 581
N 12,440 10,633 10,503 9,319 10,440 10,757
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
other
revenues
total
expenditures
capital
expenditures
current
expenditures
deficit
placebo in 2008 -5.00 68.86 15.99 50.35 -13.81
(14.26) (68.45) (46.74) (29.51) (10.67)
placebo in 2009 0.80 4.05 -11.83 15.61 -8.07
(13.18) (66.38) (49.27) (25.06) (7.50)
placebo in 2010 7.22 53.77 17.43 23.39 -4.04
(11.87) (70.00) (51.36) (25.62) (7.02)
placebo in 2011 24.51∗ -32.43 -57.67 19.81 -2.69
(13.95) (73.29) (56.43) (23.72) (7.66)
placebo in 2012 4.18 -22.16 -63.45 34.29 3.16
(13.59) (78.65) (62.00) (23.45) (10.11)
mean 75.21 1307.39 501.62 784.42 19.49
bandwidth 616 515 563 473 666
N 11,349 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,339
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; This table displays placebo effects using equation 2. These are obtained by restricting the
sample to pre-reform years, assigning the reform to a different year and finally re-estimating equation 2. In the bottom panel, the sample
mean of the outcome variable, the used bandwidth and the number of observations are shown. All revenue, expenditure, and deficit variables
are expressed in per capita terms and 2015 Euros.
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